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 THE FALSE DILEMMA OF THE ECONOMIC 
LOSS DOCTRINE 
RALPH A. ANZIVINO* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A defective product causes various types of damages.  The type of damage 
suffered generally determines whether contract or tort law will govern 
resolution of the parties‘ dispute.  Contract law will control when the loss 
suffered is considered to be solely economic loss.  For example, when a 
machine does not produce the number of parts per minute as warranted by the 
seller, the loss is solely an economic loss.  On the other hand, when a 
defective product causes personal injury, tort law will be utilized to resolve 
the dispute.  However, when the defective product causes ―other property‖ 
damage (not economic loss or personal injury), both contract law and tort law 
claim application.  The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) expressly 
provides for recovery of other property damage caused by a defective product.  
Coincidently, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability also 
expressly provides for recovery of other property damage caused by a 
defective product.  The purpose of this Article is to offer a fresh approach to 
addressing other property damage disputes that emphasizes both contract and 
tort law rather than the current approach that requires a court to choose 
between contract or tort coverage. 
II.  THE OTHER PROPERTY EXCEPTION TO THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
Courts use the economic loss doctrine to determine whether liability 
resulting from a defective product should proceed as a tort or contract case.
1
  
The doctrine provides that when a defective product causes solely economic 
loss,
2
 the buyer may pursue damages only through contract law.
3
  On the other 
hand, if the defective product causes personal injury or property damage, the 
buyer may pursue damages only through tort law.
4
  One of the main problems 
 
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. 
1. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 592 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Wis. 
1999); Sylla v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
2. For a discussion of the distinction between economic loss and noneconomic loss, see 
generally Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from 
Non-Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (2008). 
3. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 
(Wis. 1989). 
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
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in applying the doctrine is determining when a defective product has caused 
the type of property damage that permits a buyer to use tort theories to recoup 
its loss.  For example, a product that fails and damages only itself has caused 
property damage, but not the type of property damage that permits the use of 
tort theories.
5
  Damage to the product itself is tantamount to loss of product 
value and is not considered property damage.
6
  But what if the defective 
product causes damage beyond itself and damages the system of which it is a 
part?  Here again, the general rule is that when a defective product causes 
damage to the system of which it is a part, such property damage is not 
sufficient to permit the injured party to pursue tort theories.
7
  This is known as 
the integrated system rule.
8
  Thus, a defective product that causes damage to 
itself or its integrated system has not caused sufficient property damage to 
engender tort remedies.  Rather, the defective product must cause damage to 
property ―other than‖ itself or its integrated system to trigger tort theories.9  
This is known as the other property exception to the economic loss doctrine.
10
  
In this Article the use of the term ―other property‖ is intended to mean 
property damage that is damage to property other than the product or its 
integrated system. 
III.  CONTRACT LAW AND OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE 
Contract law‘s approach to other property damage, as interpreted by the 
courts, can best be described as muddled.  The primary factor motivating the 
economic loss doctrine is the availability of the U.C.C. to address conflicts 
over a product‘s performance.11  The U.C.C. contains a comprehensive system 
that balances the rights and obligations between buyers and sellers of 
products.
12
  The parties, however, are generally permitted to change the rules 
established in the U.C.C.
13
  In the event a product proves defective, a number 
of U.C.C. sections aid the buyer, such as those covering express warranties,
14
 
implied warranties,
15
 or both.  For remedies, the buyer can seek to revoke his 
 
5. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986). 
6. See Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 52 (Ill. 1997). 
7. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 876; Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 593 
N.W.2d 445, 452 (Wis. 1999). 
8. Wausau Tile, 593 N.W.2d at 452. 
9. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997). 
10. Id. 
11. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶ 15, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167; Ins. Co. 
of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶¶ 28–29, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462. 
12. Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 268–69 (N.J. 1997). 
13. U.C.C. § 1-302 (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 401.102(3) (2007–2008). 
14. U.C.C. § 2-313; accord WIS. STAT. § 402.313. 
15. U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -315; accord WIS. STAT. §§ 402.314–.315. 
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acceptance
16
 and recover damages.
17
  Significantly, the buyer is permitted to 
recover consequential damages, which includes damage to other property that 
proximately results from any breach of warranty.
18
  In other words, the U.C.C. 
provides express coverage for other property damage caused by a defective 
product.  Notably, with strict liability the U.C.C. provides parallel remedies, 
which also provide for damages when a defective product causes injury to 
other property.
19
 
The U.C.C. also has provisions that aid the seller.  In the event a product 
proves defective, the U.C.C. permits a seller to limit damages in a number of 
ways.  Damages may be liquidated to a sum certain in the contract.
20
  Also, a 
seller can exclude or modify the warranties that form the basis of a buyer‘s 
damage claim.
21
  For example, the U.C.C. permits a seller to sell a product ―as 
is‖ or ―with all faults.‖22  In addition, a seller may limit its exposure to 
damages by specifying in the sales contract that the buyer‘s remedy be limited 
to the return of the goods and repayment of the price, or to repair or 
replacement of the defective product.
23
  Finally, the seller may limit or 
exclude consequential damages.
24
  In particular, the U.C.C. provides that 
―[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages 
where the loss is commercial is not.‖25  In other words, limitation of 
consequential damages is appropriate under the U.C.C. when the loss is a 
commercial loss.  But, the U.C.C. does not define the term ―commercial loss.‖  
At least one court has concluded that the economic loss doctrine should be 
known as the ―commercial loss doctrine.‖26  Clearly, commercial loss would 
encompass economic loss as that term is understood.
27
  But, would 
commercial loss also include damages to other property caused by a defective 
product?  If so, a seller could successfully exclude other property damage 
caused by a defective product through the use of a clause in the contract 
 
16. U.C.C. § 2-608; accord WIS. STAT. § 402.608. 
17. U.C.C. §§ 2-712 to -715, 2-717; accord WIS. STAT. §§ 402.712–.715, 402.717. 
18. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b). 
19. Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Okla. 1974) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 
(1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965). 
20. U.C.C. § 2-718(1); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.718(1). 
21. U.C.C. § 2-316; accord WIS. STAT. § 402.316. 
22. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.316(3)(a). 
23. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(1)(a). 
24. U.C.C. § 2-719(3); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3). 
25. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (emphasis added); see also WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3) (emphasis added). 
26. All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 1999). 
27. For a discussion of the distinction between economic loss and noneconomic loss, see 
generally Anzivino, supra note 2. 
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excluding consequential damages.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
clearly allows a seller to contractually exempt itself from tort liability for 
other property damage caused by its defective product.
28
 
Unfortunately, unlike the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the U.C.C. 
approach is quite muddled.  One approach taken by the courts is that, despite 
the consequential damage exclusion provision in the contract, the buyer is still 
permitted to bring a tort action.
29
  These courts reason that a 
seller/manufacturer should not be permitted to disclaim or limit its tort 
liability for other property damage.
30
  Conversely, some courts indicate that a 
buyer cannot avoid any contractual limitation clauses by bringing a tort action 
for negligence or strict liability.
31
  Similarly, other courts reason that a buyer 
cannot avoid these various limitation clauses by suing for negligence when 
negligence is the basis of the claim for the breach of contract.
32
  Further, some 
courts place particular focus on the language used in the limitation-of-remedy 
clause.  These courts indicate that, ―[a]lthough the exclusion of consequential 
damages in a sales contract is ordinarily an exclusion of contract damages, the 
exclusion may be effective to exclude tort damages when the context indicates 
such broader exclusion.‖33  Finally, other courts are more exacting and require 
the exclusion of liability for negligence to be clearly expressed because the 
law does not favor such self-exculpation.
34
 
There are, of course, significant policy reasons to support the various 
approaches adopted by the courts.  Those decisions that do not extend a 
consequential damage clause to cover damage to other property are premised 
on public safety.  The policy is that manufacturers should be constantly 
encouraged to produce safer products, and that is accomplished through tort 
pressure.
35
  On the other hand, those decisions that do extend a consequential 
damage clause to cover other property damage are premised on contractual 
bargaining.
36
  The policy is that the parties are best able to assess their own 
exposures and risks inherent in the transaction and that should be a matter for 
their own bargaining.  For example, a seller/manufacturer who provides full 
warranties and no significant limitation of remedy should receive a much 
 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2) (1981). 
29. 4B LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE‘S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 2-719:9, at 10 (3d ed. 2001). 
30. Id. § 2-719:62, at 51–52. 
31. Id. § 2-719:9, at 11. 
32. Id. § 2-719:62, at 51. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Ne. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 678 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 
(Ind. 1997); McCaskill v. Welch, 463 So. 2d 942, 947 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
36. 4B LAWRENCE, supra note 29, § 2-719:66, at 55–56. 
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higher price for its product than a seller/manufacturer who provides limited 
warranties and has excluded its liability for consequential damages in the 
event of a defective product. 
Clearly, the U.C.C. provides a careful balance of protections for both 
sellers and buyers when confronted with a defective product.  Further, the 
U.C.C. permits the parties to bargain for more or less protection than the 
U.C.C.‘s starting point.  Necessarily, whether a buyer receives more or less 
protection in the final negotiated contract will affect the final sales price.
37
  
The U.C.C. also expressly permits a buyer to recover other property damage 
or consequential damages incurred as a result of a defective product.
38
  
Significantly, the U.C.C. permits a seller to exclude consequential damages, 
which may include damage to other property.
39
  However, to obtain such a 
beneficial clause, the U.C.C. anticipates that a seller should bargain for such 
protection.  But, even if a seller/manufacturer bargains for and receives a 
consequential damage disclaimer in its contract, the ability of such a clause to 
protect the seller/manufacturer from tort liability for other property damage is 
uncertain, given the numerous approaches adopted by the courts.  In sum, 
contract law‘s approach to other property damage is quite unsettled. 
IV.  TORT LAW AND OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE 
In 1965, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts created a 
special strict liability rule intended to apply to sellers of products.
40
  The strict 
liability rule essentially provides that one who sells a defective product that is 
unreasonably dangerous to a user or his property is subject to liability for 
harm to his person or property.
41
  The justifications for this rule are that by 
placing a product in commerce, a seller ―has undertaken . . . a special 
responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may be 
injured by it‖; that sellers will stand behind their products; ―that public policy 
demands that the burden of accidental [damage] caused by products‖ be 
placed upon those who profit from it, and be treated as a cost of production 
and sale; and that the buyer of such a product is entitled to the maximum 
protection by the person who placed the product into commerce.
42
  Many 
states have adopted the strict liability rule since its promulgation.
43
 
 
37. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 (1986); Ins. Co. of 
N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 31, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462. 
38. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b) (2007–2008). 
39. U.C.C. §§ 2-715, 2-719; accord WIS. STAT. §§ 402.715, 402.719. 
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. a (1965). 
41. Id. § 402A. 
42. Id. § 402A cmt. c. 
43. Markle v. Mulholland‘s Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 535 (Or. 1973). 
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In 1998, new strict liability rules were promulgated.
44
  The modern rule 
provides that ―[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise 
distributing . . . a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons 
or property caused by the defect.‖45  A product is defective if it has a 
manufacturing defect,
46
 a defect in design,
47
 or inadequate instructions or 
warnings.
48
  The objectives of the modern strict liability rule are to encourage 
greater investment in product safety, to ―discourage[] the consumption of 
defective products by causing the purchase price of [such] products to [fully] 
reflect‖ all losses incurred, and to reduce the transaction costs in litigating 
product liability claims by eliminating fault determinations.
49
  It is important 
to note that the modern strict liability rule eliminates the ―unreasonably 
dangerous‖ standard for manufacturing defects,50 but retains a ―not reasonably 
safe‖ standard for design51 and warning or instruction52 defects.  
Manufacturing defects are more likely a greater cause of other property 
damage than design or warning or instruction defects.  Thus, the substitution 
of a ―manufacturing defect‖ for an unreasonably dangerous standard in the 
modern rule signals an intent to expand tort coverage for defective products 
that cause other property damage. 
The leading case that addresses the use of tort law to recover for other 
property damage is the United States Supreme Court decision in Saratoga 
Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.
53
  In Saratoga Fishing, the hydraulic 
system used in a fishing vessel caused a fire that led to the ship‘s sinking.54  
The owner at the time of the loss was the second owner of the ship.
55
  The 
initial owner of the ship added extra equipment to the ship after he purchased 
it,
56
 but before he sold it to the second owner.
57
  The issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether the added equipment constituted other property such that it 
would permit the second owner to pursue tort theories to recover its loss.
58
  
 
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998). 
45. Id. § 1. 
46. Id. § 2(a). 
47. Id. § 2(b). 
48. Id. § 2(c). 
49. Id. § 2 cmt. a. 
50. Id. § 2(a). 
51. Id. § 2(b). 
52. Id. § 2(c). 
53. 520 U.S. 875 (1997). 
54. Id. at 877. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. (cataloging a skiff, a fishing net, and spare parts). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 879. 
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The Court held that the added equipment did constitute other property.
59
  As a 
result, the Supreme Court affirmed the second owner‘s ability to pursue tort 
law for his recovery.
60
  The Court expressly rejected the manufacturer‘s 
argument that permitting the owner to pursue its recovery under tort law 
would impose ―too great a potential tort liability upon a manufacturer or 
distributor.‖61  The Court reasoned that ―a host of other tort principles, such as 
forseeability, proximate cause, and the ‗economic loss‘ doctrine . . . would 
continue to[] limit liability in important ways.‖62  Subsequently, the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts expressly adopted the holding in Saratoga 
Fishing when it stated that ―[t]he characterization of a claim as harm to other 
property may trigger liability not only for harm to physical property but also 
for incidental economic loss.‖63  The Restatement (Third) of Torts also 
predicted that the strong majority of state courts that followed the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. Trans America Delaval Inc. 
would likely follow Saratoga Fishing as well.
64
 
The modern strict liability rule follows the damage to other property rule 
as developed by the courts.
65
  A defective product that harms only itself is not 
governed by strict liability rules, but by the laws governing commercial 
transactions.
66
  Also, when a defective product causes damage to its integrated 
system, such damage is considered to be damage to the product itself, and is 
not covered by the modern strict liability rule.
67
  The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts offers two illustrations to highlight the difference between damage to 
other property and damage to the product or its integrated system.  In the first 
illustration,
68
 ABC Company sells a conveyor belt to XYZ Company for use 
in XYZ‘s engine assembly line.69  The conveyor belt is defective and 
subsequently breaks, causing damage to XYZ‘s assembly line.70  This is 
considered to be damage to only the defective product, and as such, does not 
fall within the ambit of the modern strict liability rule.
71
  The same result is 
reached via the integrated system exception to the other property rule.
72
  In the 
 
59. Id. at 884. 
60. Id. at 877. 
61. Id. at 884. 
62. Id. 
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998). 
64. Id. § 21 reporters‘ note. 
65. See supra Part III. 
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d. 
67. Id. § 21 cmt. e. 
68. Id. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See supra Part II. 
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second illustration, the damage to the assembly line is caused by a defective 
steering mechanism in a forklift that causes the forklift to go out of control 
and collide with the assembly line.
73
  In this illustration, the damage to the 
assembly line is considered damage to other property and subject to the 
modern strict liability rule.
74
 
Recovery for damage to other property is expressly subject to coverage by 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
75
  The other property exception to the 
economic loss doctrine also provides that tort law, and not contract law, 
covers damage to other property.
76
  Both the modern strict liability rule as 
expressed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the other property rule of 
the economic loss doctrine as developed by the courts are in total agreement 
on the treatment of other property damage.  The U.C.C., however, is not in 
agreement and expressly covers cases of other property damage, not tort 
law.
77
 
V.  A PROPOSAL TO RECONCILE THE CONTRACT AND TORT APPROACHES TO 
THE RECOVERY OF OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE: THE CONTRACT-FIRST 
APPROACH 
Both contract law
78
 and tort law
79
 claim to be the proper domain to 
remedy other property damage caused by a defective product.
80
  The other 
property exception to the economic loss doctrine, as developed by the courts, 
generally provides that other property damage caused by a defective product 
is recoverable in tort, not contract.
81
  In other words, the case law simply 
ignores the express coverage of the U.C.C.  This is contrary to the general 
rule, which requires courts to make every effort to enforce statutory 
enactments, rather than simply render them meaningless.
82
 
A few states have further compounded this area of the law by adopting the 
disappointed expectations test.
83
  The disappointed expectations test provides 
that damage to other property that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of 
contracting cannot be pursued through tort law, only contract law.
84
  In other 
 
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e, illus. 4. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. § 21 cmt. f. 
76. See supra Part II. 
77. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b) (2007–2008). 
78. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b). 
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1. 
80. See supra Parts III and IV. 
81. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997). 
82. Holloway v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). 
83. See Ralph C. Anzivino, The Disappointed Expectations Test and the Economic Loss 
Doctrine, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 749, 752 n.24 (2009). 
84. See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶ 3, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167. 
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words, the disappointed expectations test shrinks the scope of the other 
property rule and expands the coverage of contract law.  Thus, depending 
upon the outcome of the enigmatic disappointed expectations test, tort law 
may cover some other property damage, and contract law may cover some 
other property damage.
85
  There is a simpler, fairer, and more user-friendly 
approach than navigating the maze of the other property rule and the 
disappointed expectations test. 
The starting point is the parties‘ contract.  The economic loss doctrine was 
created to provide greater deference to the U.C.C.
86
 and to prevent contract 
law from drowning ―in ‗a sea of tort.‘‖87  The underlying premise of the 
U.C.C. is that the parties are most apt to look after their own interests and 
contract accordingly.
88
  Therefore, the parties‘ contract should be the starting 
point to determine their relative responsibilities.  Courts should be careful not 
to permit a party to use tort law to circumvent limitations agreed upon in the 
parties‘ contract.89  Courts should focus on the contract first. 
There are many contractual limitations available to a seller/manufacturer 
that wishes to decrease or eliminate its exposure to claims of other property 
damage that may result from a defective product.
90
  Statutes define other 
property damage as consequential damages.
91
  The parties‘ contract may limit 
or exclude consequential damages.
92
  The contract may also limit a buyer‘s 
remedy to an exclusive remedy, such as repair or replacement.
93
  Further, the 
parties‘ contract may provide for a waiver of tort liability.94  All of these 
limitations can be negotiated and made part of the parties‘ contract.  There 
are, however, significant safeguards that may preclude the enforceability of 
any or all of these contractual limitations.
95
  Courts should review these 
safeguards in each case to determine the enforceability of the contractual 
limitations.  If the contractual limitations were fairly negotiated and pass 
muster upon the court‘s review of the various safeguards, the court should 
enforce the parties‘ contract terms.  Other property damage or consequential 
damages should not be recoverable in contract or tort if the contract prohibits 
 
85. Anzivino, supra note 83, at 749. 
86. See All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 865–66 (7th Cir. 1999). 
87. Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., 2005 WI 113, ¶ 7, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189. 
88. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 2004 WI 139, ¶¶ 28–31, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 
N.W.2d 462. 
89. Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 213, 217–18 
(Wis. 1989). 
90. See supra Part III. 
91. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b) (2003); WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b) (2007–2008). 
92. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719(3); WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3). 
93. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-719(1); WIS. STAT. § 402.719(1). 
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). 
95. See infra Part VI. 
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it.  Courts should not permit a tort end run around the contract. 
There are a number of cases that illustrate this Contract-First approach.  In 
Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
96
 Idaho Power purchased a 
voltage regulator from Westinghouse.
97
  The contract between the parties 
provided that, in the event the product proved defective, Westinghouse would 
not be liable for any consequential damages, whether in contract, tort, or 
otherwise.
98
  The limitation of liability agreed to in the contract was that 
Westinghouse‘s liability would ―not exceed the price of the product or part on 
which such liability [was] based.‖99  Subsequently, the regulator proved 
defective and caused a fire.
100
  The fire damaged the regulator and other 
property.
101
  Westinghouse repaired the regulator, but Idaho Power sought 
compensation for its other property damage.
102
  Idaho Power sued on breach 
of warranty, negligence, and strict tort liability claims.
103
  The Ninth Circuit 
held that the contract limitations negotiated by the parties should control.
104
  
The court found that the parties were of relatively equal bargaining strength 
and that the parties discussed the contractual limitations.
105
  Therefore, the 
court precluded Idaho Power from suing Westinghouse in either contract or 
tort. 
A similar result was reached in McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron,
106
 where 
McDermott purchased a 5,000-ton crane to be used to move the deck of an 
offshore drilling platform.
107
  The purchase contract provided McDermott 
with an exclusive repair or replacement remedy, and waived any other 
liability based on contract, tort, strict liability, or other theories.
108
  
Subsequently, McDermott was using the crane to load the deck onto a barge 
when the hook broke causing the deck to fall onto the barge.
109
  The crane and 
the deck suffered serious damage.
110
  McDermott sued the manufacturer of the 
 
96. 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1979). 
97. Id. at 925. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 928. 
105. Id. 
106. 979 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds sub. nom. McDermott, Inc. v. 
AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994). 
107. McDermott, 979 F.2d at 1070. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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crane based on contract and tort theories.
111
  The court recognized that the 
damage to the crane was damage to the product itself, and damage to the deck 
was other property damage.
112
  The manufacturer defended the contract claim 
on the basis of the exclusive remedy and defended the tort claims on the basis 
of the waiver of all tort liability.
113
  The court agreed with the manufacturer on 
both defenses.
114
  On the tort claims, the court held that contractual provisions 
that waive negligence and strict liability claims are enforceable if they pass 
close judicial scrutiny.
115
  The court noted that such clauses are common in 
commercial markets and should be enforced between sophisticated business 
entities.
116
  It was also important to the court that the contract clause 
specifically stated ―tort‖ and ―strict liability,‖ which are terms familiar to 
sophisticated business entities.
117
 
Finally, in Coach USA, Inc. v. Van Hool N.V.,
118
 Coach USA leased a bus 
from a distributor of Van Hool-manufactured buses to use in Coach USA‘s 
charter business.
119
  During a charter, the bus caught fire and caused 
substantial damage to the bus and the passengers‘ personal property.120  The 
contract between the parties provided that the distributor gave no warranties, 
and that any and all liability, whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, would be 
the sole responsibility of Coach USA.
121
  Despite the contract clause, Coach 
USA sued the distributor and manufacturer in tort to recoup its losses and for 
the damage caused to the passengers‘ personal property.122  Coach USA‘s 
theory was that the damage to the passengers‘ property constituted other 
property damage, and that, pursuant to the other property rule, tort remedies 
were available.
123
  The court agreed that the damage to the passengers‘ 
personal property qualified as other property.
124
  However, the court did not 
follow the other property tort rule, but instead upheld the contract terms.  The 
court reasoned that the economic loss doctrine was created to ―prevent[] ‗end 
runs‘ around . . . contract[s] by prohibiting parties from reworking‖ contract 
claims into tort claims when the underlying complaint is the same—a 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1071. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1071–72, 1075–76. 
115. Id. at 1076. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. No. 06-C-457-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88783 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2006). 
119. Id. at *3. 
120. Id. at *5. 
121. Id. at *4. 
122. Id. at *5–7. 
123. Id. at *11–12. 
124. Id. at *13. 
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defective product.
125
  Significantly, the court noted that the economic loss 
doctrine applies when the contract is silent with regard to tort claims, but is 
clear in its limit of contract claims.
126
  The court further reasoned that the 
economic loss doctrine is not needed where the parties‘ contract expressly 
waives any tort claims.
127
  The court indicated that when the parties signed the 
lease agreement, they anticipated the possibility of future tort claims.
128
  In the 
contract, Coach USA ―expressly [waived its] ability to bring such actions.‖129  
Thus, the court reasoned that ―[i]n the absence of any suggestion by the 
parties that the lease agreement [was] unenforceable, [Coach USA was] not 
free to ignore the plain terms of [its] contract.‖130  Finally, the court stated that 
to permit Coach USA to sue in tort ―would be contrary to the parties‘ 
legitimate expectations at the time the lease agreement was signed and would 
violate the terms of their freely-negotiated agreement.‖131  Interestingly, after 
using the contract language to resolve the dispute, the court analyzed the case 
under the disappointed expectations test and reached the same result.
132
 
Once attorneys realize that the parties‘ contract will be the starting point 
in resolving disputes over contract and tort claims for consequential damages, 
there will be much greater use of and focus on bargaining for these 
protections.  As a result, there are likely to be fewer cases where the parties 
have not bargained over these important matters.  Nevertheless, there will be 
cases where either the parties‘ contract is silent on tort waivers or, after 
review of the enumerated safeguards,
133
 the court decides not to enforce the 
limitations.  In those circumstances, the courts should simply apply the other 
property tort rule and not utilize the flawed disappointed expectations test.
134
  
Simply applying the other property rule would mean that tort law would be 
available when the contract did not validly waive tort causes of action.  The 
end result would be that both the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
are given meaning, and the determining factor would be the enforceability of 
the limitation clauses as negotiated by the parties and reviewed by the courts.  
The enigmatic disappointed expectations test simply would not be needed.
135
 
VI.  MANDATORY SAFEGUARDS BEFORE UTILIZING THE  
 
125. Id. at *9–10. 
126. Id. at *10. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at *10–11. 
132. Id. at *13–14. 
133. See infra Part VI. 
134. See Anzivino, supra note 83, at 777–78. 
135. Id. 
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CONTRACT-FIRST APPROACH 
There are many safeguards available to the courts when deciding whether 
contract clauses that limit liability, including tort liability, are enforceable.  
These safeguards are well-established and relatively routine issues where 
courts can rely on precedent to reach a decision.  These safeguards should be 
understood to be conditions precedent that must be satisfied before a tort 
waiver or an exclusion of consequential damages is enforceable. 
A.  Unconscionability 
Contracts may limit or exclude consequential damages unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.
136
  Limitation of consequential 
damages that result from injury to a person are prima facie unconscionable,
137
 
and are remedied under tort law.
138
  However, contracts can exclude or limit 
consequential damages when there is a commercial loss, provided the 
limitation or exclusion is not unconscionable.
139
  Clearly, other property 
damage qualifies as consequential damages,
140
 and can be excluded unless the 
clause is unconscionable.  Any clause waiving tort liability for other property 
damage should be subject to the same unconscionability limitation.
141
 
Unconscionability is a defined concept under the U.C.C.
142
  Courts, 
however, have further refined the concept into two parts: substantive 
unconscionability and procedural unconscionability.
143
  Procedural 
unconscionability focuses on the manner and circumstances leading up to the 
formation of the contract and concerns ―whether there was a ‗real and 
voluntary meeting of the minds‘ [between] the contracting parties.‖144  Courts 
consider factors such as ―age, education, intelligence, business acumen and 
experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the 
terms were explained to the weaker party,‖ whether the contract was an 
adhesion contract, and ―whether there were alternative providers of the 
subject matter of the contract.‖145  ―Substantive unconscionability addresses 
the fairness and reasonableness of the contract‖ terms.146  Both elements must 
 
136. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3) (2007–2008). 
137. U.C.C. § 2-719(3); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3). 
138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (1998). 
139. U.C.C. § 2-719(3); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(3). 
140. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.715(2)(b); see also supra Part III. 
141. See U.C.C. § 2-302; accord WIS. STAT. § 402.302. 
142. U.C.C. § 2-302; accord WIS. STAT. § 402.302. 
143. Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 2006 WI 53, ¶ 33, 290 Wis. 2d 514, 714 N.W.2d 
155. 
144. Id., ¶ 34 (citation omitted). 
145. Id. 
146. Id., ¶ 35. 
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be proven, but unconscionability does not require equal amounts of each.
147
  
Any contract clause purporting to waive tort liability for other property 
damage must pass the unconscionability test. 
In addition to the traditional notion of unconscionability, there is another 
circumstance where the courts make a finding of unconscionability.  Where an 
exclusive remedy in the parties‘ contract fails to provide the buyer with a 
minimum adequate remedy when the product fails to perform, some courts 
will find the exclusive remedy clause to be unconscionable.
148
  In Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus–Erie Co.,149 Phillips entered into a contract with 
Bucyrus–Erie requiring Bucyrus–Erie to manufacture and supply cranes to be 
used in Phillips‘s offshore drilling platforms in the North Sea.150  The agreed 
exclusive remedy in the contract was repair or replacement at Bucyrus–Erie‘s 
plant, which was thousands of miles from the North Sea.
151
  Subsequently, the 
cranes proved defective.
152
  Phillips argued that it should not be bound to the 
exclusive remedy because it was simply unrealistic to bring the cranes back to 
the United States.
153
  The court agreed and held that the remedy offered in the 
contract was unconscionably low.
154
  The exclusive remedy failed to provide a 
―fair quantum of remedy.‖155  Similarly, in Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.,156 the 
buyer purchased fabric to be used in his drapery business.
157
  After delivery of 
the fabric and during processing, it was discovered that the backing on the 
fabric was defective.
158
  The parties‘ contract provided that no claims could be 
made against the supplier after the fabric was cut.
159
  The court interpreted this 
clause as a consequential damage limitation.
160
  The court, however, found 
that the defect was not discoverable until the fabric was cut.
161
  As a result, the 
court held that the no-cut clause was unconscionable because it failed to 
provide either a minimum or an adequate remedy to the buyer in the event of 
 
147. Id., ¶ 33. 
148. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus–Erie Co., 388 N.W.2d 584, 592 (Wis. 1986); Trinkle v. 
Schumacher Co., 301 N.W.2d. 255, 259 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
149. 388 N.W.2d 584. 
150. Id. at 586. 
151. Id. at 588. 
152. Id. at 586. 
153. Id. at 591. 
154. Id. at 592. 
155. Id. 
156. 301 N.W.2d 255 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). 
157. Id. at 256. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 258. 
161. Id. at 256. 
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breach.
162
  Therefore, the consequential damage limitation was not 
enforceable.
163
  Courts should not give effect to any contract clause that 
purports to waive tort liability for other property damage and is found to be 
unconscionable. 
B.  Failure of Essential Purpose 
The U.C.C. provides that ―[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or 
limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided 
[under the U.C.C.].‖164  A leading case that illustrates how a remedy fails of 
its essential purpose is Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc.
165
  In Murray, the 
Murrays purchased a motor home.
166
  The Murrays‘ contract had a clause that 
excluded all consequential damages, and provided that the Murrays‘ exclusive 
remedy in the event of a defect in the motor home was repair and 
replacement.
167
  The motor home had a number of defects, and the defendant 
was unable to cure them after a reasonable opportunity to do so.
168
  The court 
held that the contract‘s limited remedy failed of its essential purpose169 
because it did not satisfy ―[t]he purpose of an exclusive remedy of repair and 
replacement[, which] is to give [the buyer] goods which conform to the 
contract.‖170  As a result of the failure, the court concluded that the buyer was 
entitled to remedies under the U.C.C., including the right to recover 
consequential damages.
171
 
Similarly, in Wisconsin Plating Works of Racine, Inc. v. Beckart 
Environmental, Inc.,
172
 Wisconsin Plating needed a system to treat the effluent 
produced by its electro plating plant prior to discharging it into the city sewer 
system.
173
  Beckart contracted to design and install a satisfactory system.
174
  
The contract contained both an exclusive remedy of repair or replacement and 
a clause excluding consequential damages in the event the system failed.
175
  
 
162. Id. at 259. 
163. Id. 
164. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 402.719(2) (2007–2008). 
165. 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978). 
166. Id. at 516. 
167. Id. at 518–19. 
168. Id. at 516–17. 
169. Id. at 523. 
170. Id. at 520. 
171. Id. at 526.  Some courts do not recognize failure of essential purpose as a limitation on a 
clause excluding consequential damages.  Those courts only recognize unconscionability as a 
limitation by strictly adhering to the different language in § 2-719(2)–(3).  See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., 
Inc. v. Nat‘l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980). 
172. No. 96-1043, 1997 WL 134595 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1997). 
173. Id. at *1. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at *2. 
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The system proved defective, and Beckart was unable to repair the system 
within a reasonable time.
176
  The court held that despite Beckart‘s best efforts 
to cure the defects, the exclusive remedy of repair or replacement failed of its 
essential purpose.
177
  Thus, Wisconsin Plating was able to pursue full 
remedies under the U.C.C., including the recovery of consequential damages, 
despite the contract clause prohibiting such recovery.
178
  Courts should not 
enforce any exclusive remedy in a contract that fails of its essential purpose, 
and should thereby permit the buyer to pursue its contract or tort remedies 
depending on the type of damages incurred. 
C.  Battle of the Forms 
Another limitation on contract clauses limiting liability, including tort 
liability, is the battle of the forms.  The phrase ―battle of the forms‖ is used to 
identify the difficulty of ascertaining whether a contract has been formed and 
what the terms of the contract are when buyers and sellers transmit forms to 
each other that contain conflicting terms.
179
  More specifically, if a seller 
transmits a form to a buyer that contains an exclusive remedy and a clause 
excluding consequential damages, are such terms part of the contract?  The 
terms may or may not be part of the contract depending upon the battle of the 
forms determination.
180
  In Rich Products Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc.,
181
 Rich 
Products Corp. was engaged in the manufacture of food products.
182
  Kemutec 
was a distributor of conveyor belts used in the manufacturing of food 
products.
183
  Kemutec‘s standard terms and conditions of sale provided for the 
exclusive remedy of repair and replacement, excluded consequential damages, 
and waived the buyer‘s right to make any claim in negligence or strict 
liability.
184
  During the formation of the contract, Kemutec was unable to 
establish that it ever transmitted its standard terms and conditions to Rich 
Products.
185
  Subsequently, when it was discovered that the conveyor belt 
contaminated Rich Products‘ food products, Kemutec raised the various 
 
176. Id. at *5. 
177. Id. at *7. 
178. Id. 
179. BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES ¶ 8.03(8) 
(1984). 
180. Wis. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830 F.2d 1405, 1411 (7th Cir. 
1987); Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 772 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1985); Rich Prods. 
Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 955 (E.D. Wis. 1999). 
181. 66 F. Supp. 2d. 937. 
182. Id. at 944. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 946. 
185. Id. at 951. 
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limitations, exclusions, and waivers as a defense.
186
  The court, however, held 
that the limitations, exclusions, and waivers did not become part of the 
contract when the various forms were exchanged.
187
 
In Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
188
 
Westinghouse sold a transformer to Wisconsin Power.
189
  Various proposals, 
purchase orders, and letters were transferred between the parties.
190
  The 
transformers subsequently proved defective and caused extensive damage.
191
  
Westinghouse‘s standard terms of sale provided an exclusive repair or 
replacement remedy, excluded consequential damages, and prohibited any 
claim in tort.
192
  Wisconsin Power sought to recoup its losses through 
negligence and strict liability claims.
193
  Westinghouse asserted the various 
limitations in its defense.
194
  The court reasoned that through the exchange of 
the various forms, the standard terms of Westinghouse became part of the 
contract.
195
  As a result, Wisconsin Power contractually agreed to limit its 
remedies in contract and tort, and was not permitted to avoid its agreement.
196
 
D.  Rigorous Standards Must Be Met Before a Tort Waiver Is Enforceable 
As a general rule of contract law, a clause in a contract that exempts a 
party from tort liability for property damage caused by his own negligence is 
enforceable.
197
  The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that other property 
damage caused by a defective product falls within the coverage of product 
liability.
198
  The Restatement (Third) of Torts further provides that ―[a]lthough 
recovery for harm to property other than the defective product . . . is governed 
by this Restatement, the [American Law] Institute leaves to developing case 
law the questions of whether and under what circumstances contracting 
parties may disclaim or limit remedies for harm to other property.‖199  Most 
importantly, the Restatement states that contractual limitations on tort liability 
for harm to property, when fairly bargained for, may provide an effective way 
for the contracting parties to efficiently allocate risks of such harm between 
 
186. Id. at 951–52, 955. 
187. Id. at 955. 
188. 830 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1987). 
189. Id. at 1406–08. 
190. Id. at 1406–09. 
191. Id. at 1409. 
192. Id. at 1407–08. 
193. Id. at 1409. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 1411. 
196. Id. at 1411, 1413. 
197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981). 
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 21 (1998). 
199. Id. § 21 cmt. f. 
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themselves.
200
  It is significant to note that the Institute‘s comments are 
directed toward property damage, including other property damage, and not 
personal injury.  Significantly, the Restatement permits contractual limitations 
on tort liability for harm to other property. 
A number of state supreme courts have permitted parties to contractually 
allocate the risk of foreseeable property damage due to a defective product.  In 
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
201
 Salt River purchased a gas turbine generator 
from Westinghouse.
202
 Subsequently, the generator proved defective and 
caused an explosion and fire.
203
  After resolving the battle of forms between 
the parties, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the parties‘ contract 
included an exclusive remedy, a limitation of liability, a tort waiver, and a 
clause excluding consequential damages.
204
  One issue before the court was 
whether parties could legally contract for a waiver of tort liability.
205
  The 
court held that tort remedies could be validly waived in a contract.
206
  The 
court reasoned that ―[i]n a commercial setting there are often sound reasons‖ 
to bargain away remedies, including tort, should losses occur.
207
  For example, 
a lower price for the product may be the quid pro quo for the buyer assuming 
defects in the product.
208
  By bargaining over which party is to bear the risk of 
a defect in the product and setting the price accordingly, the parties achieve a 
more rational distribution of the risk than the law otherwise allows.
209
  This 
rationale, of course, presupposes that the contracting parties actually 
considered the ramifications of a defective product and have incorporated 
their conclusions into their contract.
210
  Notably, the court identified four 
factors that must be satisfied to effectively waive potential tort liability.
211
  
Those factors are as follows: (1) the parties must be dealing in a commercial 
setting; (2) their bargaining positions must be relatively equal; (3) they must 
bargain over the specifications of the product; and (4) they must actually 
bargain concerning the risk of loss from defects in the product.
212
  A tort 
 
200. Id. 
201. 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984). 
202. Id. at 202. 
203. Id. at 204. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 212. 
206. Id. at 213. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 213–14. 
212. Id. 
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waiver cannot be effectuated through a battle of the forms.
213
  In other words, 
―[t]ort remedies may not be waived in an unknowing exchange of forms 
between shipping clerk and order clerk.  An actual bargain must be made by 
those responsible for the transaction.‖214  When the four factors are satisfied, 
there is no public policy impediment to a tort waiver.
215
  In Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Bucyrus–Erie Co.,216 Bucyrus–Erie sold cranes to Phillips for use on 
their drilling platforms in the North Sea.
217
  The contract between the parties 
contained a clause providing that Bucyrus–Erie‘s warranty of repair and 
replacement was in lieu of all tort liability.
218
  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
indicated that as a matter of public policy, such tort waivers are not 
enforceable in the absence of specificity with respect to the tort disclaimed.
219
  
Further, the disclaimer must make it apparent that the parties struck an 
express bargain ―to forego the possibility of tort recovery in exchange for 
negotiated alternate economic advantages, e.g., lower contract cost or express 
concessions on other terms.‖220  In sum, it is clear that parties can provide for 
tort waiver in their contract, but they must satisfy the rigorous standards 
established by the Salt River Project and Phillips Petroleum courts. 
E.  Statutory Protection Other than the Uniform Commercial Code 
In addition to those safeguards that derive directly from the U.C.C. and 
common law contracts, there are other statutory protections as well.  The 
U.C.C. specifically provides that non-U.C.C. law shall supplement the 
Code.
221
  The non-U.C.C. law includes both common law
222
 and statutory 
law.
223
  The U.C.C. was drafted in the context of common law and equity, and 
relies on those bodies of law to supplement it.
224
  Although the U.C.C. 
specifically enumerates a list of supplemental law,
225
 the list is intended to be 
merely illustrative, not exclusive.
226
  Although the primary source of 
supplementation is common law and equity as interpreted by the courts,
227
 
 
213. Id. at 215. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 213. 
216. 388 N.W.2d 584 (Wis. 1986). 
217. Id. at 586. 
218. Id. at 587–88. 
219. Id. at 589. 
220. Id. 
221. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2003); accord WIS. STAT. § 401.103 (2007–2008). 
222. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2. 
223. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 3. 
224. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 2. 
225. Id. § 1-103(b). 
226. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 4. 
227. Id. § 1-103 cmt. 3. 
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there are ―a growing number of [federal and] state statutes addressing specific 
issues that come within the scope of the [U.C.C.].‖228  In those cases where 
the statute provides some additional protection for a contracting party, those 
statutes will control over the U.C.C.
229
  Each state, of course, has its own 
unique statutory and regulatory protections.  But, some examples of these 
types of statutes are the Wisconsin Consumer Act,
230
 the Wisconsin Lemon 
Law,
231
 and the Magnuson–Moss Federal Warranty Act.232  These are only a 
few of the significant statutory protections other than the U.C.C. available 
through federal and state statutes that supplement the specific U.C.C. 
safeguards.
233
 
 
228. Id. 
229. See id. 
230. WIS. STAT. chs. 421–429 (2007–2008). 
231. WIS. STAT. § 218.0171. 
232. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006). 
233. Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 274 (N.J. 1997). 
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F.  Protection from Gross Negligence 
A contract term that exempts a party from tort liability for damages 
caused by reckless conduct is unenforceable on public policy grounds.
234
  
Gross negligence is defined as a ―conscious, voluntary act or omission in 
reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another.‖235  
Thus, a clause in a contract can exempt a party from negligent conduct,
236
 but 
not grossly negligent conduct.
237
  In Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Waukesha 
Bearings Corp.,
238
 Lykes Brothers, who operated a large cargo ship, 
purchased a stern sealing system from Waukesha Bearings to keep seawater 
out of the ship where the propeller shaft passes through the hull.
239
  The 
contract between the parties provided for an exclusive remedy, a 
consequential damage disclaimer, and a tort waiver in the event the system 
was defective.
240
  Subsequently, the system failed due to a defective valve in 
the system.
241
  The court noted that the limitation of liability clauses contained 
―in the Waukesha [Bearings] invoices . . . effectively limit[ed] Waukesha[ 
Bearings‘] liability for consequential damages under any theory of warranty, 
strict liability or negligence.‖242  However, the court stated that, for reasons of 
public policy, the protection afforded by the limitation of liability clauses only 
extended to ordinary negligence, not to gross negligence.
243
  Therefore, the 
court stated it had to address the difficult questions of whether Waukesha 
Bearings had a duty to test the valve and, if so, whether its failure to do so 
was negligence or gross negligence.
244
  The court reasoned that because 
Waukesha Bearings had recommended the use of that particular valve in the 
system, Waukesha Bearings had a duty to test the valve.
245
  Further, the court 
concluded that Waukesha Bearings‘ failure to test the valve constituted gross 
negligence.
246
  The gross negligence finding was based on the magnitude of 
the foreseeable damages that would be incurred if the valve proved 
defective.
247
  The court identified the foreseeable damages that would result 
 
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (1981). 
235. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1062 (8th ed. 2004). 
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2). 
237. Id. § 195(1). 
238. 502 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. La. 1980). 
239. Id. at 1166. 
240. Id. at 1168–70. 
241. Id. at 1170. 
242. Id. at 1172. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 1173. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 1173–74. 
247. Id. 
1142 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1121 
from a defective valve to be: (1) loss of the ship‘s lubricating oil ―with 
possible bearing damage and pollution law violation[s]‖; (2) ―removal of the 
vessel from service‖; and (3) the expense of dry-docking the vessel, with the 
attendant expenses of finding and correcting the damage.
248
  As a result of 
Waukesha Bearings‘ gross negligence, the court did not enforce any of the 
contractual limitations of liability.
249
 
VII.  RATIONALES THAT SUPPORT THE CONTRACT-FIRST APPROACH TO 
OTHER PROPERTY DAMAGE 
A.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Enhances the 
Principles that Support the Economic Loss Doctrine 
The economic loss doctrine is based on three fundamental principles.
250
  
Those principles are: ―(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort 
law and contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties‘ freedom to allocate 
economic risk by contract; and (3) to encourage the party best situated to 
assess the risk [of] economic loss, the commercial [buyer], to assume, 
allocate, or insure against that risk.‖251  The Contract-First approach to 
resolving other property damage disputes enhances the principles that underlie 
the economic loss doctrine. 
1.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Sharpens the 
Distinction Between Contract and Tort, and Promotes the Public Policies that 
Support both Contract Law and Tort Law 
The first principle underlying the economic loss doctrine is to maintain 
the fundamental distinction between contract and tort law.  Both contract and 
tort law lay claim to be the most appropriate means to afford recovery when a 
product proves defective and causes other property damage.
252
  The contract 
claim is based on the U.C.C. and the fact that the parties‘ contract should 
resolve disputes over damages that were foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.
253
  The tort claim is based on the public safety notion that a 
manufacturer should be encouraged, through the threat of tort liability, to 
produce safe products.
254
  Because both contract and tort law claim to be the 
province for resolving disputes over damage to other property caused by a 
defective product, it is not surprising that the federal and state courts have not 
 
248. Id. 
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settled on a uniform approach.
255
  The reason for the discordant results is that 
the courts have been choosing between contract and tort law by analyzing 
numerous difficult issues
256
 when they can largely avoid those issues.  The 
optimal solution would be one that utilizes both contract (bargaining) and tort 
(safety) rationales, and is fair in application.  The Contract-First approach 
maximizes both contract and tort rationales, is simple to apply, and is more 
just than the current approach.  The first step is for the court to simply 
determine if the parties‘ contract has allocated the risk of other property 
damage.  For example, if the parties‘ contract provided that in the event the 
product proves defective and causes other property damage the buyer waives 
the right to sue in tort and agrees to other remedies, the court should enforce 
that clause, subject to satisfying the numerous safeguards described in the 
preceding section.  The court should not permit the aggrieved party to do an 
end run around the contract.  In other words, the first step in resolving an 
other property damage dispute would be to determine if the contract actually 
addresses the matter.  Subject to compliance with the safeguards,
257
 the parties 
could resolve all their liability issues through their contract.  There would be 
no need for the court to decide the difficult issues currently associated with an 
other property dispute that have led to conflicting decisions by the courts.  It 
would be much easier for a court to distinguish a contract case from a tort 
case under the Contract-First approach. 
However, in those cases where the contract did not resolve the issue, 
either because the safeguards were not satisfied, or the contract was silent on 
the matter, then tort principles should apply to the other property damage as 
provided in the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  The effect of having tort 
principles apply in the event the contract did not resolve the other property 
damage claim is to provide a strong incentive for the seller/manufacturer to 
introduce the matter into the negotiations.  A Contract-First approach 
encourages seller/manufacturers and their counsel to introduce the other 
property damage issue into the negotiation process.  It will also encourage the 
seller/manufacturer to satisfy the required safeguards so that the damage 
limitations are enforceable.  It is much more likely that the matter will be 
introduced into the negotiations if the seller/manufacturer has an incentive to 
do it, unlike with the disappointed expectations‘ approach, which punishes the 
buyer for not having negotiated some protection.  The Contract-First approach 
to handling other property damage claims satisfies the public policy of both 
 
255. See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
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expectations test. 
257. See supra Part VI. 
1144 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1121 
contract (bargaining) and tort (safety) law, and will encourage parties to 
resolve their disputes through contract negotiations, rather than litigation. 
One could argue that the Contract-First approach is unfair to 
seller/manufacturers because in the event the parties fail to agree on a 
limitation, tort principles will apply.  In other words, the buyer has little 
incentive to agree to a limitation of remedy clause.  There are a number of 
responses to such an argument.  First, the seller/manufacturer can choose not 
to contract with that particular buyer, and avoid any tort exposure.  Second, in 
many cases, seller/manufacturers are significant entities and have a strong 
enough bargaining position to overcome the perceived disadvantage.  And 
finally, the disappointed expectations test creates a prejudice against the buyer 
in that, without any agreement, foreseeable other property damage is not 
recoverable in tort.  Thus, the seller/manufacturer receives tort immunity 
without any bargaining.
258
  On balance, the Contract-First approach is more 
likely to cause the parties to negotiate over prospective damages, reduce court 
battles, sharpen the distinction between contract and tort cases, and give due 
regard to both contract bargaining and public safety concerns. 
2.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Maximizes the 
Contracting Parties‘ Ability to Allocate the Economic Risks of the 
Transaction 
The second principle underlying the economic loss doctrine is to protect 
the parties‘ freedom to allocate their economic risk.  The economic loss 
doctrine provides that when a defective product causes solely economic loss, 
the buyer‘s remedy is solely under contract law.  The current approach to 
other property damage is that such damage is recoverable through tort theories 
if there is other property damage after applying the integrated system rule and, 
in some states, the disappointed expectations test.  The parties‘ contract is not 
determinative or relevant, and the courts must apply the preceding, confusing 
doctrines. 
The Contract-First approach to other property damage reverses the general 
rule for other property damage recovery.  The Contract-First approach to other 
property damage focuses solely on the contract to determine if the parties 
have allocated the risk of other property damage in their contract.  If so, the 
parties‘ contract should control the disposition of the other property damage 
claim, not tort law.  Thus, under the Contract-First approach to other property 
damage, the economic loss doctrine would apply to solely economic loss and 
to other property damage, when covered by the contract and approved by the 
court.  The net effect of the Contract-First approach is to give the contracting 
parties greater opportunity to allocate the economic risks of their transaction 
 
258. See supra Part V. 
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and avoid application of the difficult integrated system rule and bewildering 
disappointed expectations test.  The parties‘ contract would be permitted to 
allocate the risk of economic loss and other property damage, of course, 
subject to scrutiny by the courts with regard to the safeguards.  The Contract-
First approach obviously maximizes the ability of the parties to allocate the 
risks in the transaction by initially focusing on the parties‘ contract. 
3.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Encourages the 
Parties to Assess the Economic Risk and Negotiate Concerning Its Allocation 
The third principle underlying the economic loss doctrine places the 
burden on the buyer to assume, allocate, or insure against the risk that the 
product will prove defective.  The assumption is that the buyer is best able to 
foresee the damages that a defective product might cause the buyer.
259
  It 
would seem equally reasonable to place this risk on the seller/manufacturer 
since the seller has the most experience with the kind of damage its defective 
product has actually caused.  Nevertheless, the question should be which party 
is more likely to introduce the prospect of damages into the contract 
negotiations so that the parties can address contract damages before a loss, 
rather than litigate liability after the loss. 
At least one court has seriously questioned whether the buyer is the best 
party on which to place the burden of negotiating for future damages.  In 
Foremost Farms USA Cooperative v. Performance Process, Inc.,
260
 a buyer 
purchased a defoamer that subsequently proved defective and contaminated 
food products that the buyer produced.
261
  In discussing whether the buyer 
generally is the best party to foresee future damages by a defective product, 
the court offered some rhetorical questions that challenge this assumption.  
When referencing a dispute between a farmer and its chemical supplier over a 
defective crop spray, the court asked, ―do farmers . . . normally know that a 
chemical applied to crops for one purpose might cause harm in a manner 
unrelated to the expected function of the chemical?  To what extent are . . . 
farmers expected to contemplate possible damage scenarios?‖262  The court 
noted that a careful buyer might anticipate the desirability of obtaining broad 
contractual protection against all damages caused by a defective product, but 
no manufacturer or distributor would agree to such far-reaching liability.
263
  
Thus, the possibility of such buyer protection is primarily theoretical.  And, as 
a result, it discourages the buyer from introducing the issue into the 
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negotiations.  On the other hand, when using a Contract-First approach, the 
seller/manufacturer has a strong incentive to seek limitations and protection 
from tort liability in the parties‘ contract.  Thus, in nearly every negotiation, 
the seller/manufacturer will be seeking contract protections.  The net result is 
that, in most cases, the parties‘ contract will determine the risk allocation 
rather than the court, and for the seller‘s negotiated limitations the buyer will 
receive some quid pro quo rather than nothing, which is the current situation.  
Currently, with the integrated system rule and the disappointed expectations 
test, an other property damage case is virtually always a contract case.
264
  The 
bottom line is that the Contract-First approach gives the seller/manufacturer a 
significant incentive to seek contractual limitations for its potential tort 
liability for other property damage.  That incentive will ensure that the 
contract negotiations will include consideration of damage limitations.  Thus, 
if an agreement is reached, the parties‘ contract will allocate the economic 
risks, assuming it passes judicial scrutiny on the safeguards.  If the parties do 
not reach an agreement, the buyer can seek a more hospitable 
seller/manufacturer.  In either case, the commercial parties are controlling 
their business risks, not the court in hindsight. 
B.  Unlike the Current Approach, the Contract-First Approach to Other 
Property Damage Provides a Level Playing Field 
The economic law doctrine rules, as currently applied, clearly favor 
seller/manufacturers.  If a seller/manufacturer sells a defective product that 
causes solely economic loss, the buyer‘s remedy is in contract.265  On the 
other hand, if the defective product causes other property damage, the buyer‘s 
remedy is said to be in tort.
266
  However, once the other property claim passes 
through the prism of the integrated system rule and the reasonably foreseeable 
rule,
267
 there is virtually no tort claim remaining.
268
  In other words, the seller 
may not bargain for any tort immunity through the parties‘ contract, but 
nevertheless receives the immunity through the current approach.  The 
Contract-First approach to other property damage does not favor either party.  
It simply permits the parties to negotiate their agreed treatment of other 
property damage should it occur.  Further, by providing that, in the absence of 
contractual agreement on the treatment of other property damage, such 
damage is subject to tort liability, the seller/manufacturers will be certain to 
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seek limitations in their contract negotiations.  In sum, a Contract-First 
approach to other property damage is a more open, honest, and fair approach 
to handling other property damage disputes.  It does not suffer the flaw in the 
current approach, which is to provide an un-bargained-for tort immunity, 
which clearly favors seller/manufacturers. 
C.  The Contract-First Approach Is Subject to Stringent Safeguards 
One could argue that any approach that permits a seller/manufacturer‘s 
contract to control its tort liability is a prescription for abuse.  However, not 
all contracts between a seller/manufacturer and a buyer will be allowed to 
control a seller/manufacturer‘s exposure to tort liability when a defective 
product causes other property damage.  Rather, there are a number of 
safeguards that parties must satisfy before their contract will control the 
disposition of the other property damage claim.  The first is that the contract 
will not be enforced if the court finds it to be unconscionable.
269
  Second, if 
the seller/manufacturer has contracted for an exclusive remedy that fails of its 
essential purpose, the court will not enforce any limitations in the parties‘ 
contract.
270
  Third, another impediment to a seller/manufacturer enforcing its 
limitations on a buyer is the battle of forms analysis.
271
  Simply because the 
seller/manufacturer has limitation-of-liability clauses in its standard terms and 
conditions does not mean such limitations will become part of the parties‘ 
contract.  Fourth, for a seller/manufacturer to be able to waive tort liability for 
other property damage due to a defective product, the seller/manufacturer 
must meet very specific and precise requirements.
272
  Failure to satisfy any 
one of the requirements of specificity means the contract limitations are not 
enforceable.  Fifth, the U.C.C. specifically provides that extra-U.C.C. law 
supplements the Code.
273
  In other words, courts should use any additional 
common law decisions or statutes to protect buyers.  Some statutory examples 
are the Magnuson–Moss Federal Warranty Act,274 the Wisconsin Consumer 
Act,
275
 and the Wisconsin Lemon Law.
276
  There are many federal and state 
statutes similar to these that are designed to protect buyers from an 
overreaching seller/manufacturer.  Finally, a contract clause that exempts a 
seller/manufacturer from tort liability for damages caused by the 
seller/manufacturer‘s gross negligence is unenforceable on public policy 
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grounds.
277
  Thus, if the other property damage is the result of the 
seller/manufacturer‘s grossly negligent conduct, the contract limitations will 
not be enforced. 
All of these safeguards must be satisfied for a court to determine that a 
seller/manufacturer‘s contract limitations are fair and appropriate.  After 
review, if the court determines the contractual limitations are enforceable, 
then no tort end run around the contract should be permitted.  On the other 
hand, if the party does not comply with one of the safeguards, the court should 
not enforce the contract limitations.  Rather, the other property damage should 
be recoverable in tort law as provided by the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
278
  
The Restatement recognizes the integrated system rule, but not the 
disappointed expectations test.  If seller/manufacturers understand that their 
failure to comply with safeguards makes tort recovery available, 
seller/manufacturers will have a strong incentive to comply with the various 
safeguards.  Thus, the Contract-First approach to other property damage and 
the other property tort rule will actually complement each other. 
D.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Focuses on the 
Actual Bargain Between the Parties, and Not on What Could Have Been 
Within the Scope of the Bargain as Required by the Disappointed 
Expectations Test (a.k.a. the Reasonably Foreseeable Rule) 
The modern reasonably foreseeable rule provides that when a defective 
product causes other property damage and such damage was reasonably 
foreseeable by the buyer at the time of contracting, the buyer cannot recover 
other property damage in tort law.
279
  Despite the fact that the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts indicates that such other property damage is recoverable in 
tort and that the buyer did not contractually agree to waive tort recovery, the 
rule denies the buyer the right to sue in tort.  This denial is based on the fact 
that the buyer could have foreseen the damages, and therefore, could have 
protected himself from such damages.  Unquestionably, the modern 
reasonably foreseeable rule represents a significant loss of rights for the 
buyer.  At the same time, the tort immunity gained by the seller/manufacturer 
is a significant benefit.  This entire transfer of rights and benefits occurs by 
judicial fiat, not as a result of arm‘s-length bargaining between the parties.  
The Contract-First approach to other property damage avoids this judicial 
imposition on the buyer, and instead focuses on the actual bargain struck 
between the parties. 
It is an established rule of law that courts generally strive to preserve the 
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agreed allocation of risk between contracting parties.
280
  Contract law, 
including the U.C.C., was ―designed to allow the parties to allocate the risk of 
product failure.‖281  The economic loss doctrine allows and protects both the 
manufacturer‘s and buyer‘s freedom to allocate economic risk by contract.282  
Seller/manufacturers may bargain for limitations of liability, including tort 
waivers, and in essence, buyers may pay a lower price.
283
  The economic loss 
doctrine seeks to hold parties to their bargain.
284
  Absent unusual 
circumstances,
285
 there is generally no reason to intrude into the parties‘ 
allocation of risk of loss and to extricate the parties from their bargains.  
Unquestionably, the focus of the economic loss doctrine is on the actual 
bargain that was struck, not on what the scope of the bargain could have been.  
The Contract-First approach to other property damage is in complete harmony 
with the economic loss doctrine‘s focus on the actual bargain that was struck. 
E.  Public Safety Will Not Be Sacrificed by Permitting the Parties’ Contract to 
Allocate the Risk of Other Property Damage 
One could surmise that to allow a seller/manufacturer to limit its tort 
exposure through its contract would essentially eliminate tort claims, and 
thereby undercut the seller/manufacturer‘s duty to produce safer products.  
That supposition, however, would not be accurate.  The other property rule 
provides that when a defective product causes other property damage, the 
aggrieved party can sue in tort to recover its damages.
286
  However, after 
application of the integrated system rule
287
 and the reasonably foreseeable 
rule,
288
 there are very little other property damages available where tort 
remedies can be used.
289
  Thus, the public safety incentive that was the 
impetus for the other property tort rule has been steadily eroded to the point of 
near-extinction. 
A seller/manufacturer‘s incentive to produce safer products is not 
diminished by having the parties‘ contract address other property damage 
claims.  Courts have indicated that, because a seller/manufacturer ―‗can[not] 
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predict with any certainty that the damage [its] unsafe product causes will be 
confined to the product itself [or its system], tort liability . . . continue[s] to 
loom as a possibility.‘‖290  Thus, the incentive to build safer products is not 
diminished by using a Contract-First approach to other property damage.  
Also, the Contract-First approach to other property damage is only applicable 
when the parties‘ contract covers the allocation of risk and passes judicial 
review of the safeguards.  Thus, the traditional tort rule should apply in those 
cases that do not pass judicial scrutiny or where the contract is silent on risk 
allocation.  Therefore, the Contract-First approach to other property damage 
will actually increase tort coverage and thereby enhance public safety.  
Currently, there are few, if any, other property damage cases that survive the 
integrated system and reasonably foreseeable tests to qualify for tort coverage.  
But, under the Contract-First approach to other property damage, those 
contracts that fail the court‘s safeguard review or are silent on risk allocation 
would qualify to be brought as tort claims.  The net result would be in 
increase in tort cases and a boost to public safety. 
F.  The Bargaining Rationale that Is the Root of the Reasonably Foreseeable 
Rule Supports the Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage 
A number of rationales were offered to support the creation of the 
reasonably foreseeable rule of the disappointed expectations test.  First, the 
reasonably foreseeable rule appears to be a logical extension of the integrated 
system rule.  The integrated system rule stems from the United States 
Supreme Court‘s decision in East River Steamship Corp. v. Trans America 
Delaval Inc.
291
  In East River, turbines were installed as part of a propulsion 
system for supertankers.
292
  Upon use, the turbines proved defective and 
damaged the propulsion systems in the supertankers.
293
  After incurring 
$8 million in damages,
294
 the shipowners sued the shipbuilder arguing tort 
theories on the basis that the defective turbines caused other property damage 
by injuring the propulsion system.
295
  The Court noted that ―[i]n the traditional 
[other] ‗property damage‘ case[], the defective product damages other 
property.‖296  But in this case, the Court held there was no other property 
damage.
297
  Rather, the Court reasoned that the turbines were part of an 
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integrated system and, as such, when the defective turbines damaged the 
system of which it was a part, there was no other property damage.
298
  The 
Court reasoned that ―‗all but the very simplest of machines have component 
parts, [and as such,] [a contrary] holding would require a finding of [other] 
‗property damage‘ in virtually every case where a product damages itself.  
Such a holding would eliminate the distinction between warranty and strict 
products liability.‘‖299  The effect of the integrated system rule is to expand 
the domain of contract law by shrinking the number of those cases that qualify 
as other property damage cases under tort law.  The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts has accepted the reasoning of the integrated system rule.
300
  The premise 
of the rule is simple: it is reasonably foreseeable that a defective component 
part will likely damage the system of which it is a part, and as such, this 
damage should not be considered other property damage but damage within 
the contemplation of the sales contract.  When a product is purchased, both 
parties should consider the possibility that the product may prove defective, 
and protect themselves accordingly.  Obviously, when the product is a 
component part of a system, damage to the system is an eminently foreseeable 
event, and as such, the contract between the parties should address that 
possibility.  Thus, the integrated system rule is based squarely on the 
forseeability that a defective component will damage its system.
301
  The 
reasonably foreseeable rule is a logical extension of the integrated system 
rule.  It simply extends the damages that are foreseeable beyond the product‘s 
integrated system to all those damages that were foreseeable at the time of 
contracting.  The Contract-First approach encourages the parties to negotiate 
all foreseeable damages and incorporate the agreed result into their contract. 
There is a second, and perhaps more compelling, rationale for the rule.  
Contract and product liability law serve different purposes.  Product liability 
law governs the relationship between a consumer and a manufacturer where it 
is generally not possible for the parties to negotiate all the terms of sale.  
Product liability law, therefore, places a burden on the manufacturer to 
produce safe products.  On the other hand, contract law applies to commercial 
transactions where the terms and conditions of the sale can be negotiated to 
each party‘s satisfaction.  Contract law operates on the assumption that 
commercial parties can allocate the costs and risks of the product‘s  
non-performance through the bargaining process.  When a defective product 
is purchased in a commercial setting and causes property damage, the 
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situation implicates both tort and contract law.  When the court in Grams v. 
Milk Products, Inc. adopted the disappointed expectations test, the court 
clearly indicated that the bargaining rationale should control.  The court 
reasoned that ―[t]he ‗disappointed expectations‘ concept is grounded in 
contract principles of bargaining and risk sharing, not on a redefinition of 
‗other property.‘‖302  The better question, however, is whether the focus 
should be on the potential bargain or the actual bargain. 
Michigan was the first state to adopt the reasonably foreseeable rule of the 
disappointed expectations test.
303
  In Neibarger v. Universal Cooperatives, 
Inc., a dairy farmer purchased a milking system to milk his cows.
304
  After the 
system was in operation for a period, the cows became ill and died, or had to 
be sold for beef.
305
  It was determined that the vacuum system on the milking 
equipment was defective.
306
  The farmers sued on contract and tort theories to 
recover their losses.
307
  The main issue before the court was whether the 
contract or tort statute of limitations should apply.
308
  At the time the farmers 
filed their case, the contract statute of limitations had expired, but the tort 
statute of limitations had not.
309
  In discussing the economic loss doctrine, the 
court explained that the doctrine turns ―on a distinction between transactions 
involving the sale of goods for commercial purposes where economic 
expectations are protected by commercial and contract law, and those 
involving the sale of defective products to individual consumers who are 
injured in a manner . . . traditionally . . . remedied by resort to‖ tort law.310  
The court reasoned that the economic loss doctrine allows commercial parties 
―to predict with greater certainty their potential liability for product failure 
and to incorporate those predictions into the price or terms of the sale.‖311  
Moreover, the court noted that the parties ―have the opportunity to negotiate 
the terms and specifications, including warranties, disclaimers, and limitations 
of remedies.‖312 
Further, the court underscored the importance of applying the U.C.C. in 
resolving disputes between commercial parties that do not involve personal 
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injury.
313
  In Neibarger, the defective milking system damaged more than 
itself; it damaged the farmer‘s cows, which were other property.  The court 
noted that in many cases, failure of a product to perform as expected might 
result in damage to other property.
314
  However, the court held that where the 
failure of a product to perform as expected causes damage to other property, 
and such damage was within the contemplation of the parties at the time of 
contracting, the recovery for such damage should only be under the provisions 
of the U.C.C.
315
  The court reasoned that property damage that is foreseeable 
at the time of contracting is considered consequential damages under the 
U.C.C.
316
  In the court‘s opinion, contract principles are ―more appropriate for 
[resolving] claims for consequential damage[s] that the parties have, or could 
have, addressed in their [contract].‖317  The court characterized the damage to 
the cows caused by the defective milking system as a ―common problem for 
dairy farmers‖ and a ―normal part of the dairy business.‖318  As a result, the 
court held the damages were reasonably foreseeable other property damage at 
the time of contracting and only recoverable through the U.C.C., not tort law.  
Clearly, the Neibarger decision was also based on the bargaining rationale. 
Another case that underscores the bargaining rationale as a primary factor 
in the adoption of the disappointed expectation test is Detroit Edison Co. v. 
NABCO, Inc.
319
  In Detroit Edison, a utility company contracted with Dravo 
Corp. to supply pipe to be used in a power plant.
320
  The pipe was used to 
carry steam.
321
  A number of years after installation, one of the pipes burst, 
injuring seventeen people and causing significant property damage.
322
  Detroit 
Edison filed a product liability action to recoup its $20 million in damages.
323
  
Dravo defended on the basis that the economic loss doctrine barred the tort 
claims and that Detroit Edison‘s sole remedy was under the U.C.C.324  The 
Sixth Circuit applied the Neibarger analysis.  The court reasoned that 
Neibarger requires a court to focus on the parties involved and the nature of 
the product‘s use.325  The court noted that both parties were ―commercial 
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entities of equivalent bargaining power‖ and ―were in a position to fully 
negotiate . . . the issue of potential liability‖ at the time of contracting.326  
Further, with the U.C.C. warranties as a baseline, the parties could have 
considered the costs of bearing the risk of a defective pipe and allocated the 
costs of such risk with certainty.
327
  Finally, the court indicated that ―[t]he 
parties could have then passed on their respective costs, as a cost of doing 
business, and ‗[thereby] spread the burden over a broad commercial 
stream.‘‖328  The court held that it was foreseeable that pipes that carry steam 
at high temperatures and pressures could explode upon failure.
329
  The court 
characterized the damages caused by the explosion as an inherent hazard.
330
  
The court concluded that Detroit Edison could have foreseen and internalized 
in its costs of doing business the consequences of this inherent hazard.
331
  The 
court did not permit Detroit Edison to ―use tort law to shift onto Dravo the 
entire burden of the risk associated with the defective product.‖332  Rather, the 
court indicated that the dispute should be resolved under the U.C.C.
333
 
It is clear that the disappointed expectations test is premised on the 
bargaining rationale.  The rationale is that the buyer should address reasonably 
foreseeable other property damage in its contract; if not, the buyer is prohibited 
from pursuing any recovery through tort law.  The Contract-First approach to 
recovery for other property damage is also premised on the bargaining rationale.  
But, the critical difference is that the Contract-First approach focuses on the 
actual bargain that was struck, and not on what the bargain could have been. 
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G.  The Contract-First Approach to Other Property Damage Is a Simpler and 
More User-Friendly Approach than the Current Approach 
The majority of courts
334
 currently use an approach that involves difficult 
determinations for the contracting parties, practicing attorneys, and the courts.  
For example, the first step is to distinguish economic loss damage from other 
property damage.
335
  Courts have characterized this distinction as having ―‗an 
appealing charm of simplicity‘‖ that ―‗cannot stand the test of pragmatism or 
logic.‘‖336  Further, the current approach is compounded by two judicially 
created rules that also must be considered.  The first rule is the integrated 
system rule.  The integrated system rule provides that when a product proves 
defective and damages itself and the system of which it is a component, no 
other property damage has occurred.
337
  It has often proved very difficult for a 
court to determine where a system ends and where other property begins.
338
  
The second rule which some states
339
 have also adopted when determining if 
other property damage has occurred is the disappointed expectations test.
340
  
Under the disappointed expectations test, damage to other property is not 
other property damage if the damage was foreseeable to the buyer at the time 
of contracting.
341
  Again, this is a very challenging determination for a 
court.
342
  The net effect of these rules is to virtually eliminate tort coverage for 
other property damage.
343
  In other words, after applying these difficult rules, 
the net result is that other property damage is almost always a contract matter.  
The Contract-First approach simply eliminates these difficult and contentious 
determinations and focuses the court‘s attention on the contract between the 
parties to determine how the parties have allocated the risk of other property 
damage.  Subject to judicial review of the current safeguards,
344
 the parties 
can agree in their contract whether contract or tort remedies are available.  
The safeguards are customary determinations that are familiar to the courts, 
unlike the determinations required under the current approach.  The Contract-
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First approach is a very simple and easy means to resolve other property 
damage claims.  In those cases where the parties‘ contract is silent on other 
property damage, or the contract limitations fail to satisfy the enumerated 
safeguards, the courts can resort to the other property rule as expressed in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
When a defective product causes other property damage, the courts have 
been faced with a conundrum.  Should the courts follow statutory law (the 
U.C.C.) and apply contract law, or the Restatement (Third) of Torts and apply 
tort law in resolving the dispute?  Different courts have selected different 
paths.  The courts have indicated that each path is mutually exclusive of the 
other.  In other words, the current approach is for courts to choose between 
applying contract or tort law.  The choice, however, is a false dilemma.  There 
is a better approach to resolving an other property damage claim.  The courts 
should first consult the parties‘ contract to determine if it addresses the 
recovery of other property damage.  If it does, the court should enforce the 
contract, provided various safeguards were met in the contracting process.  
The various safeguards are well established in contract law and assure the 
court that the contractual provisions dealing with other property damage were 
actually and fairly negotiated.  The Contract-First approach encourages the 
parties to assess and allocate the risks and rewards of the transaction in their 
contract, and enforces their agreement, subject to the safeguards.  The 
approach does not permit an end run around the contract.  If the safeguards 
are not met, the parties‘ contract should not control the other property damage 
dispute, tort law should.  Under this approach, the free bargaining rationale of 
contract law and the public safety rationale of tort law are both in play.  The 
fact that the contract‘s failure to satisfy the safeguards will cause tort law to 
be applicable, discouraging sellers from overreaching for fear that tort law 
will come into play.  The net result is an approach that encourages the parties 
to address other property damage in the negotiation process and to reach a fair 
agreement over its treatment. 
